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Abstract—Colocation facilities and Internet eXchange Points
(IXPs) provide neutral places for concurrent networks to daily
exchange terabytes of data traffic. Although very reliable, these
facilities are not immune to failure and may experience difficulties
that can have significant impacts on exchanged traffic. In this
paper we devise a methodology to identify collocation facilities
in traceroute data and to monitor delay and routing patterns
between facilities. We also present an anomaly detection tech-
nique to report abnormal traffic changes usually due to facilities
outages. We evaluate this method with eight months of traceroute
data from the RIPE Atlas measurement platform and manually
inspect the most prominent events, that are: an IXP outage, a
DDoS attack, and a power failure in a facility. These case studies
validate the benefits of the proposed system to detect real world
outages from traceroute data. We also investigate the impact of
anomalies at the metropolitan-level and identify outages that span
across up to eight facilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) and colocation facili-
ties have played an important role in the evolution of the
Internet [1], [2]. By joining IXPs, lower tier networks are able
to exchange traffic at a much lower cost than using traditional
transit networks [3], and at the same time experience better
network performance [4]. Consequently, IXPs are now critical
parts of the global Internet [5]–[7] where terabytes of traffic
is exchanged daily [8]. The success of IXPs is a double-edged
sword as it also means that a disruptive event at a single
IXP, or one of its colocation facility, can have an impact
across numerous networks. In one example, a power outage
on April 8, 2018, at a facility of one of the largest IXP in
the world, DE-CIX Frankfurt, had broadly affected Internet
connectivity across all Germany [9]. The increasing criticality
of IXPs provides a clear motivation for the development of
techniques to detect disruptions and performance degradations
at colocation facilities.
This work investigates the use of data plane information to
detect anomalies at IXP facilities. We leverage existing large
scale traceroute results collected by the RIPE Atlas measure-
ment platform to model usual traffic patterns at colocation
facilities and detect abnormal changes. The proposed method
is composed of two parts: (i) Using IP addresses obtained
in traceroutes we infer border routers connected to IXPs
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and links crossing colocation facilities. (ii) Then we identify
abnormal delay and routing changes between facilities using
non-parametric statistics.
Both colocation facility detection [10] and abnormal de-
lay/routing detection [11]–[14] have been separately addressed
in the literature. We study both topics jointly and in the process
improve the existing methods. This work complements the
literature with several contributions:
• We design a unified method to detect facility outages,
outages between ASes peering at an IXP, and facility or
IXP maintenances.
• This includes a method, called the Rule-based Con-
strained Facility Search (RCFS), for the detection of
colocation facilities in traceroute data.
• We also adapt existing delay and routing monitoring
methods to the particular case of colocation facilities.
• The implemented system provides a unique view on inter
and intra facility delays and packet forwarding patterns.
• Reported alarms are ranked by order of importance so
network operators can focus only on important anomalies.
Our system is evaluated with eight months of traceroute
data from the RIPE Atlas platform. We manually check the
most prominent detected outages and cross-validate our results
with information made publicly available by the community
or IXP operators. We also study the geographical span of
outages and found events affecting multiple facilities in the
same metropolitan area.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: First, we
define the necessary background (Section II) and our datasets
(Section III). Then, we describe the proposed method (Sec-
tion IV), evaluate it (Section V) and report the existing lim-
itations (Section VI). Finally, we close with the conclusions
(Section VII).
II. BACKGROUND
First, we introduce the peering infrastructure terminology
and provide background to infrastructure outages.
A. Internet eXchange Point (IXP)
An IXP is a network infrastructure that facilitates public
peering among participant ASes [3]. IXPs usually operate at
layer 2 and provide low latency and high throughput solutions
to their customers.
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Their infrastructure can range from a single switch with a
few interconnected members to a distributed system spanning
across multiple continents. Large IXPs are deployed in various
locations (e.g., colocation centers) to provide their services to
numerous networks. The IXP members routers are directly
connected to ports of the IXP switches. Upon agreement of
the member to the IXP terms and conditions and the successful
assignment of an IXP address, the AS is ready to exchange
traffic with other IXP participating networks [3].
B. Colocation Facility (Colo)
Colos are buildings that provide secure places for networks
to bring in their equipment and interconnect. Cooling, fire
protection, stable power, backup generators, high bandwidth
cables are only few of the services they offer to satisfy their
customer needs [10]. Big IXPs usually install access switches
in multiple colos in the city they operate. Colo customers may
then utilize the IXP infrastructure to exchange traffic with
members of remote colos [10]. Large companies may also
operate multiple colos under the same city and connect them
via cross-connect links [10]. This distributed interconnection
offers better protection and stability during an outage [15].
The peering options usually available at Colos are: 1)
Public peering, where the IXP infrastructure is utilized for
the communication (Fig. 1A&B), 2) Private peering, where
the two peers directly exchange data either via private IXP
links (tethering [10]) or by directly connecting with each other
(cross-connect [16], Fig. 1 C,D and E) and 3) Remote peering,
where a network not present in the facility remotely connects
to the IXP [17].
In this paper, we identify public peering and under certain
conditions, also private peering links. The monitoring of
remote peering links is not part of this work.
C. Peering Infrastructure Outages
Colos and IXPs play an important role to interconnect
thousands of peers around the world [15]. Power failures,
human errors, attacks and natural disasters affecting these
infrastructures may be critical for the Internet connectivity of
thousands users. Yet, only the most severe outages are publicly
reported by mailing lists (e.g., NANOG, outages mailing lists),
news websites, and local operators. Consequently, evaluating
a facility outage detection tool is challenging due to the lack
of ground truth data.
To the best of our knowledge, [15] was the first study that
built an automatic tool for detecting peering infrastructure
outages in near real time. The authors proposed the use of
location information conveyed by BGP communities [18],
IXP and colocation websites to geolocate the source of BGP
update messages. Observing multiple BGP updates in a short
period, triggered their investigation module to examine if they
were interconnected with the same colocation facility or IXP.
Finally, they used active traceroutes as a mean to validate the
disruption in the data plane.
Compared to this past study our work has a more limited
scope since it uses only data plane measurements. Yet for the
observed facilities we expect to have better monitoring results.
BGP is a control plane protocol that reveals some inter-domain
connections but based on their routing policies networks
usually avoid announcing all their peering on BGP (e.g. private
peerings). Using data plane information and the large scale
deployment of RIPE Atlas we strive to monitor more peering
links and focus only on those that are actually in use. In
addition traceroute provides RTT data that allows us to identify
detrimental delay increases within and between facilities, for
example caused by DDoS attacks (see Section V-C2). This
type of events has no impact on the control plane so it is
undetected by methods using BGP data.
III. DATASETS
This work aims to detect network disruptions at colos using
traceroutes data. First we seek to identify routers located in
colos and then monitor unusual routing and delay patterns for
the facilities intra and inter links (Fig. 1). To achieve this, we
leverage multiple datasets:
RIPE Atlas built-in and user IPv4 Paris traceroutes
measurements from May until December 2015. The built-
in measurements consist in traceroutes done every 30 minutes
from all Atlas probes (about 10k probes) towards all DNS
root servers and a few servers operated by RIPE NCC [19].
In order to be closer to end-users and achieve lower latencies,
numerous DNS root server instances are deployed at IXPs.
Consequently the root DNS servers make excellent traceroute
targets to monitor colos over time. The user measurements
are used for a different purpose. Because they are initiated on
demand and are usually lasting for a short period of time, we
do not use the user measurements for anomaly detection but
only to detect additional peering relationships between colo
members (Section IV-B).
PeeringDB [20] provides diverse details about IXPs. For
example, IP prefixes used for peering LANs, the facilities
where IXPs are present, and ASN of member networks.
This database is maintained by IXP and network operators.
We query PeeringDB to first identify IXP addresses in the
traceroute path and then extract candidate facilities. Although,
our closest available snapshot is one year after the traceroute
measurements (24/09/2016) we assume it is still accurate.
CAIDA’s Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK [21]).
Our facility detection algorithm seeks for IXP addresses in
traceroute, but routers do not always answer with their IXP
interface [22]. We utilize ITDK’s IP to alias resolution dataset
to identify alias IXP interfaces in the traceroute’s path. We use
the aliases resolved by MIDAR [23] and iffinder [24] which
yield the highest confidence with very few false positives.
Since ITDK becomes available every 6 months we use the
closest snapshot produced on August 2015.
Routeviews prefix-to-AS map. PeeringDB provides AS to
facility mappings. To retrieve the ASN of IP addresses found
in traceroutes we use daily dumps derived from Routeviews
between May and December 2015. We make such conversions
from traceroutes only when it is necessary to identify the
facility (Rule 3&5 of section IV-B).
TABLE I: Notations used in the methodology section.
Notation Meaning
Alias(X) The alias interfaces of IPX (Includes IPX)
AS(X) The ASN of IPX
F(X)= {FA , ... , FZ} Facilities where the network X is present
All datasets are also available for IPv6, something not taken
under consideration in this study. Networks may establish
different peering decisions over IPv6 paths [25], [26]. Further-
more, IPv6 may be affected differently by RTT delays [27].
A comparison between IPv4 and IPv6 anomalies would be
interesting but this is left for future work.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Using traceroute data we aim to detect delay and forwarding
anomalies at colos. To achieve this goal we propose to model
the usual delay and forwarding patterns observed between
colos and detect deviant patterns. Specifically, the proposed
system performs the following steps every one hour: 1) It
examines the built-in measurements to detect IXP connected
routers (Section IV-A) then 2) identifies the colos involved
in the peering communication (Section IV-B & IV-C) and
finally 3) computes delay and forwarding patterns and detects
anomalies (Section IV-D).
A. IXP Identification
The goal of this step is to isolate IP addresses related to co-
los. Since IXPs are usually located at colos and peering LANs
are easily identifiable in traceroutes, we use IXP addresses to
find traceroutes traversing colos.
In the beginning, we parse the built-in traceroutes and
extract the IP path. We sanitize it by removing hops with errors
or invalid IPs (i.e. *). For the remaining clean path we query
PeeringDB to check if any of the observed IP addresses belong
to IXP peering LANs. If such an IP is found we extract the IXP
and the previous IP hop (e.g., those of IPA&B in Fig. 2). Since
an IXP appears in the path, we conclude that the traceroute
traversed a public peering link.
Private peering is harder to identify because no IXP address
appears in the path (like in Fig. 1C,D,E). Instead we check
if alias IPs are used that are assigned to routers with IXP
interfaces. Upon finding two sequential ones we extract the
corresponding hops (e.g., those of IPA&C in Fig. 1C).
At the end of this step, we obtain IP hops related to colos.
In the next step we use the IP of the first and the IP of the
second hop to detect the corresponding near-end and far-end
colo. We call them near and far-end with respect to their order
in the traceroute path.
B. Facility Detection Phase (RCFS)
To identify the colos, we improve the constrained facility
search (CFS) method [10] to better exploit the information
provided by PeeringDB. The original algorithm combined IXP
information from multiple sources but in doing so it ignored
useful mappings between the IXP address and the AS of the
customer (refer to rule 2).
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IPA & IPB. IPB & IPC are IXP addresses.
In our experiments with PeeringDB we observed that the
IXP to facility mappings are more reliable than the AS to
facility mappings. This is the case mainly because IXPs
tend to carefully maintain their PeeringDB entries to attract
new customers [3]. However, AS entries may be outdated or
contain limited information, e.g. for security concerns. Based
on these observations, we propose a rule (RCFS) model which
strategically constrains the facility search for the specific case
of PeeringDB.
Following the example of Fig. 2 for each extracted hop we
first consider the IXPs in the alias list (Rule 1&2) then the
remaining AS information of this list (Rule 3) and finally, if
we could not identify the colo, the IXP and AS information
of the next hops (Rule 4&5). If possible, we avoid IP to AS
conversions for border routers as they are prone to errors.
The detection of the near-end colo is thoroughly described
below using IPA. The same method can be applied for the
detection of the far-end using IPB. Each rule receives as input
the candidate colos of the previous rule then constrains them
and forwards them to the next rule. The algorithm stops when
either a single candidate remains or none due to conflicts
between rules. Note that rules can be skipped. For example,
if there is no alias for an IP then R3 output is R3 input.
Rule 0: User yielded information. We allow the user to specify
IP interfaces that are known as belonging to a colo router.
If such an IP is found then we conclude that the traceroute
traversed the specified colo. We use this rule to map a few
known IPs close to the DNS Root servers [14] that were
missing from PeeringDB.
Rule 1: Facilities of the IXP. We begin by looking for IXP
addresses in the Alias(IPA) list. If such addresses are found
we fetch from PeeringDB all the colos of the identified IXP.
Notice that a router may be connected to multiple IXPs. In
Fig. 2, the router of IPA is connected to IXPA&C. This allows
to further constrain the candidate colos: R1 = F (IXPC) ∩
F (IXPB) = {FA, FB , FC} ∩ {FA, FB} = {FA, FB}. Since
we obtained several colos, we proceed to Rule 2.
Rule 2: Facilities of the IXP address. IXP operators report
on PeeringDB the addresses they assign to their customer
networks. If in Rule 1 we observe such an IXP address, we
retrieve the customer’s ASN from PeeringDB’s IXP page.
Then the colos where the customer is present. We intersect
these results with the ones of Rule 1. In our example, the
router owner is ASA thus R2 = R1∩F (ASA) = {FA, FB}.
This rule was not useful for the near-end. It is important though
for the far-end as it reveals the AS of the far-end connected
peer which is not always visible in the traceroute.
Rule 3: Facilities of the alias ASNs. When the IXP data
are not sufficient we instead focus on networks peering inside
the colo. First, using Routeviews we convert each non-IXP
address of the Alias list to the corresponding ASN. Then for
each AS we fetch the candidate colos from the ASN pages in
PeeringDB. The final results of this rule are the colos where
all the ASes and the IXP (if any from R1/R2) are present.
In our example, the router with IPA is connected to routers
of ASB and ASC. If ASB used addresses of its domain to
establish the peering interconnection it is visible in the alias
list thus, R3 = R2 ∩ F (ASB) = {FA}.
Sometimes, incomplete AS/IXP entries may return no can-
didate colos. We ignore those. If all R1, R2, R3 are skipped
we stop the facility identification here. The following rules
focus on the next hops. Although useful we avoid using them
sooner because of traceroute problems, e.g. routers answering
from another interface [28] or load balancing not be mitigated
by Paris traceroute [29].
Rule 4: Facilities of next hop (IXP). Midar’s alias resolution
has a small false positive rate yet false negatives are possible.
This means that IXP addresses may be missing from the
alias list in Rule 1. Assuming that routers answer with their
inbound interface, the IXP of the near-end is surely observed
after crossing the IXP link (IPB&C in Fig. 2). Rule 4 takes
advantage of this observation to constrain with colos of
undetected IXPs that appeared in the next hop. We consider
as next hops all those that appeared in the built-in and user
defined measurements during the same day.
Rule 5: Facilities of next hop (AS). As a last resort, following
the idea of Rule 4 we pick all the alias(es) of IPA and for
each IP we resolve the next hop AS(es). Our goal is to reveal
additional peerings between ASA and networks that were not
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Fig. 3: Dropped IPs based on the sliding threshold. With a
50% threshold every IP is accepted meanwhile with a 100%
threshold only consistent IPs are accepted; 32% (left) and
6.3% (right) are lost.
observed in Rule 3. Then we utilize the colos of these ASes
to constrain our facility search. However, for colos that are
geographically close, cross-connect links may cause wrong
inferences (e.g., Fig. 1D&E). In order to mitigate this problem,
we independently intersect each new peer’s colos with the
results of Rule 4. Among the independent intersections we
pick as candidate the colo which appeared in the majority if
it accounts at least 75% of those intersections.
The 75% threshold is empirically found with our traceroute
dataset. Compared to the 100% threshold which discards 32%
of the IPs the 75% discards 26.7% as depicted in Fig. 3
(left). This allows identification of a few additional colos, 5.3%
in total. Although, there is the possibility of some incorrect
inferences, we consider this threshold beneficial for identifying
routers used to establish multiple peering relationships.
At the end of this step, we temporarily store the near-end
and far-end identifications. In the next step we make the final
colo decision. Note that for the case of intra-colo links the
near-end and far-end colos are the same (like in Fig. 1B&C).
C. Temporal Consistency
Some of our datasets are daily updated, hence outlier values
may temporarily appear and punctually impact the facility
identification results. To address this issue we check the
stability of the IP to facility mappings across time and clean
aberrant results. Fig. 3 (right) depicts that only a few IPs
(6.3%) are unstable.
D. Anomaly Detection
Links between colos are critical. Disruptions on these links
may cause connectivity problems to thousand Internet users.
We adjust the techniques of [14] and build a simple tool to
detect abnormal patterns for the specific case of colos. First,
we compute the forwarding pattern of each colo (Section
IV-E) then, the delay of each near-end link towards the far-
end (Section IV-F) and, lastly we compare those two patterns
to computed references to detect anomalies (Section IV-G).
E. Forwarding Model
We collect traceroutes for each Atlas probe, extract the
colos, and count the number of times links between colos
are traversed. From all different probes, we aggregate those
counters to produce the forwarding pattern of each near-end
AB C
D
E
100 250
80
70
(a) Time t-1
A
B C
D
E
50 210
170
70
(b) Time t
Fig. 4: Usual (a) and anomalous (b) forwarding patterns for
colo A towards the far-end colos B, C, D and E.
colo. We compare it to a computed reference that represents
usual patterns (see Section IV-G).
Figure 4 illustrates an example of this pattern for the near-
end (A) towards each far-end (B,C,D,E). The usual forwarding
pattern computed at hour t-1 is FA = [100, 250, 80, 70]. In
the next hour, we notice an unusual decrease in the packets
towards B and C accompanied by a similar increase towards
facility D.
To detect anomalous patterns, we test for homogeneity with
the chi-squared test and the following null hypothesis:
Null hypothesis: The observed data for an hour is consistent
with the normal reference computed from the previous hours.
Alternative: The observed data is not consistent with the
normal reference.
Since Atlas probes traceroute the same destination every
30 minutes, under normal network conditions, we expect the
current pattern to be consistent with the distribution of the
reference. For the chi-squared test we set a significant level of
0.01 under which we reject the null hypothesis and report an
alarm. Since, this type of test does not work properly for small
expected values (< 5), we sum counts from far-end colos with
less than 5 packets into one variable.
Usually only few paths are responsible for a forwarding
anomaly. Suppose F = {pi ∈ [1, n]} is the anomalous pattern
and F = {pi ∈ [1, n]} the computed reference. We reuse
the responsibility metric defined in [14] to detect which path
caused an anomaly:
ri =
pi − pi∑n
j=1 |pj − pj |
The responsibility metric values range from [-1, 1]. Negative
values stand for paths with an unusually low number of
packets. Positives values represent an unusually high and
values close to zero for normal situations.
F. Delay Change Detection
Estimating delays for intra and inter facility links is not
a trivial task because of traceroute limitations, such as path
asymmetry and RTT variability [14], [30], [31].
In [14] a technique is proposed to address these challenges
when a link is observed by a sufficient number of probes with
different return paths. That technique monitors the shifts in
the distribution of the median differential RTT(RTTDiff ) and
distinguishes strong alarms. Since, colo links are usually mon-
itored by multiple probes from different ASes with disparate
return paths, we implement that monitoring technique.
From Section IV-A we extracted the IP hops and the RTT
values. In Section IV-B we found the facilities. So for the
traceroute of Fig. 2 RTTDiff = RTTfarend−RTTnearend =
RTTIPB−RTTIPA. We group all RTTDiff values from the
same near-end towards the same far-end colo and calculate
the median over those to ensure that an anomaly will trigger
only if the majority of RTT values between the two facilities
get affected. Note that multiple routers of colo A and colo B
may be involved in this grouping. Like in [14], we calculate
confidence intervals for both the observed and the reference
RTTDiff to detect significant statistical changes. If those
confidence intervals stop to ovelap we report an alarm like
those of Fig. 9.
G. Reference Computation
The normal reference to detect anomalies is computed every
hour using exponential smoothing for both the forwarding and
delay patterns:
mReft = amt + (1− a)mReft−1 , FReft = aFt + (1− a)FReft−1
Where mReft is the reference RTTDiff of the monitored link,
and FReft the reference forwarding pattern of the facility.
Likewise, mReft−1 and F
Ref
t−1 are the reference patterns of the
previous hour and, mt and Ft are the current observed values.
The exponential smoothing parameter a ∈ (0, 1), controls the
importance of new measures as opposed to previous observed
ones. In our case, we set a = 0.03 to mitigate faster the impact
caused by sudden anomalous bursts.
The initial reference value mRef0 and F
Ref
0 are quite
important when a is small. To solve the cold start problem, we
calculate them over the median of the values observed during
the first day of our analysis. We maintain a different reference
for each facility and update them at each one-hour time bin.
V. SYSTEM EVALUATION
Now we evaluate our proposed rules and their assistance in
identifying facilities. Then, we discuss the anomaly detection
results and present the most significant detected disruptions.
Anomaly detection systems are usually evaluated in terms
of true positives and false posititives, however, in our case
such validation is challenging since confidential information
is needed both for the facility detection and alarm validation.
We verify the correctness of our anomaly detection system
by checking our top reported alarms, and the public reports of
major outages that took place in 2015. In our results we report
anomalies caused by an IXP outage on May, a power failure
in colocation facility at mid November and a DDoS attack at
the end of November.
A. RCFS Evaluation
We evaluate our facility identification method, RCFS, with
the built-in measurements from May until December 2015.
On average, each day we analyze 12 million traceroutes and
TABLE II: Average facility converges & failures by each rule.
Average % Rule 0 Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5
Successes % 0.097 5.391 18.188 15.289 46.731 14.301
Failures % 0 0.604 2.803 23.823 19.224 53.543
Unique Router Interfaces observed per day: ∼14.500
Days from 5/1/2015 to 31/8/2015
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Fig. 5: Daily % of unique IPs whose facility was identified be
each rule(left) or failed to do so(right).
extract 14.500 unique router interfaces potentially located in
colos forming 14 million IP interconnections. This large num-
ber of interconnections is due to the rich inter-IXP connectivity
[32].
To understand the contribution of each RCFS rule, we
picked a smaller dataset, from May to August, and inspected
in details the identification results per rule. For this smaller
dataset RCFS consistently identifies facilities for 4000 of the
14500 interfaces (28%).
Table II and Fig. 5 depict the contribution of each rule for
the facility identification. We observe that the first three rules
are responsible for 39% of the detected facilities. For the rest
61%, next hop information is required (Rule 4&5). Rule 4 is
responsible for the majority of identifications since, the near-
end colo requires knowledge of the IXP whose IP interface
usually appears in the next hop, e.g. like in Fig. 1A&B. In our
experiments we also used Rule 0 to map a few IPs (< 0.1%)
not listed in PeeringDB but on the IXP websites.
Similarly, the right-hand side plot of Fig. 5 reveals the rules
where the identification failed. RCFS fails identifying the colo
when the search space becomes empty. Failures at the last rule
5 usually mean that we are unable to detect sufficient peering
relationships to constrain the candidate colos. As shown in
Fig. 6, this is the case for about 85% of the IPs. For these
interfaces we would require additional active traceroutes either
from RIPE Atlas or from other sources (e.g. CAIDA Ark).
From the above figures, we clearly observe that our results
are consistent and stable over time. This is required for the
anomaly detection to safely identify pattern discrepancies.
B. Anomaly Detection Evaluation
From the 4000 daily interfaces between May and December
2015 we monitor links between 264 facilities. From those
colos, 156 were reported as anomalous at least once. In total
we found that the observed patterns deviate from the computed
references 13135 times for the forwarding analysis and 19850
times for the delay analysis. 61% of the forwarding alarms last
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Fig. 8: Top-80 RTTDiff and forwarding alarms.
less than 1 hour while, 81.6% and 90.8% last less than 3 and
8 hours respectively (Fig. 7). Similarly, 59% of the differential
RTT alarms last less than 1 hour while 81.% and 90.3% last
less than 3 and 6 hours respectively.
The cause of network disruptions in colos is usually short
lived yet traffic patterns can be affected for multiple hours. For
instance, for the AMS-IX outage described in Section V-C1,
a 10 minute disruption in the IXP affected the forwarding
patterns of colos for 2 hours. Longer lasting alarms are
indications either of permanent routing changes (Fig. 12) or
of a strong alarm corrupting the reference value (Fig. 9). In
both cases, the alarm will continue to be reported until the
reference converges to new observations.
Our system is sensitive to small pattern changes, but, as
described below, we can focus only on significant anomalies
by ranking alarms based on their deviation from the reference.
1) Ranking Delay Anomalies: When we detect a differential
RTT anomaly we calculate the deviation between the reference
and the observed confidence intervals (eq 6 in [14]). We use
this metric to rank the differential RTT anomalies after we
remove those where both a delay change and a forwarding
anomaly occurred. This is because a change in the forwarding
pattern is likely to affect the median RTT and thus to create a
false alarm. Among the top-80 alarms in Fig. 8 we observe
3 outstanding cases.
The first case affected Equinix London LD5 on 2015-9-4
22:00 UTC for 2 hours. We observe both intra and inter facility
links getting congested (Fig. 9). The second was due to a
DDoS attack at the end of November (described in details in
Section V-C2). The third stands for delay changes on a link
that connects Interxion Frankfurt(FRA1-12) with Speedbone
Berlin on 2015-6-8 19:00 UTC. Validation from public sources
was only possible for the DDoS outage.
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Fig. 9: Top1 delay alarm affecting intra links of Equinix LD5
(up) and inter links towards Equinix LD8 (down).
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Fig. 10: Top1&4 forward-
ing alarms from Equinix
Frankfurt(FR7) to Equinix
Amsterdam(AM7) at 10-6-
22:00 & 11-5-22:00 UTC.
Fig. 11: Usual number of affected
facilities in the top10 cities. * an-
notates unusual outages.
2) Ranking Forwarding Anomalies: We use the mean
squared error to quantify the change in the forwarding patterns
of each near-end facility:
MSE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Fi − F i)2
where n is the number of far-end colos, Fi and F i the observed
and the reference forwarding pattern towards far-end colos.
All top alarms report significant changes in the number of
traceroute passing through a link like the example illustrated
in Fig. 10. Such spikes may happen due to inter-facility link
failures or routing changes. We hypothesize that the two one-
month apart alarms of Fig. 10 are due to maintenance work.
3) Detecting Metropolitan Outages: To further validate our
system, we quantify the impact of detected anomalies on colos
of the same metropolitan area. We first extract each facility’s
address and use the Google Maps API to obtain the local city’s
GPS coordinates. Then, using those coordinates we calculate
the Vincenty distance between each colo and map the ones
closer than 50km to the same metropolitan area.
We focus only on the metropolitan alarms with the largest
impact by filtering out all those that don’t include forwarding
anomalies with |ri| ≥ 0.4. Table III annotates the top-10
metropolitan areas based on the number of such observed
alarms. Usually most alarms affect only a few facilities in
those cities. We found a few instances where the alarms
spanned across multiple facilities (Fig. 11). As an example,
TABLE III: Top10 cities based on the alarms observed.
Cities Frankfurt Amsterdam London Vienna Tokyo
Alarms 459 399 216 125 77
Cities Los Angeles New York Milano Munich Hong Kong
Alarms 65 59 57 53 52
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(c) Interxion Science Park → Equinix AMS South East (AM7)
Fig. 12: Routing changes observed during the AMS-IX outage.
the AMS-IX outage [33] caused forwarding anomalies to links
between 8 local facilities (see Sec.V-C1).
C. Case Studies
To validate our system we looked for events in 2015 that
were publicly disclosed either on mailing lists [34], [35] or
by network operators. Usually the source of the outage and
the entities affected are not made publicly available. In some
cases, even the exact duration of the event is not reported,
however local news websites and reports can provide good
hints for an estimation. We discuss three major events that
occurred in May and November 2015 that our system reports.
1) Amsterdam Exchange Point (AMS-IX) Outage: In May-
13 between 10:00-12:30 an outage at Amsterdam’s core In-
ternet switch infrastructure [36] caused online problems in
several parts of the Netherlands. According to news websites
the cause was due to a technical fault inside the IXP [33].
Using our system we report up to 8 local facilities with
an unusual low and an unsual high forwarding pattern. For
example, the outage caused sharp decreases of the number
of traceroutes towards Interxion Science Park (Fig. 12 (a)).
Simultaneously, Science Park members seem to have used
backup paths leading to facilities both inside (Fig. 12 (c))
and outside of the country (Fig. 12 (b)). We observe that the
paths leading inside the country, towards Equinix AM7, did
not revert back to their usual values probably because of new
routes selected after the outage (Fig. 12 (c)).
2) DDoS attack against DNS Root Servers: On November
30, 2015 from 6:50 to 9:30 UTC, and on December 1
from 05:10 to 6:10 UTC, the DNS root servers received an
unusually high number of spoofed queries [37]. Each root
server has been differently affected by this malicious traffic
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Fig. 13: DDoS outage affecting links of Global switch to-
wards a)Digital realty(Wenckebachweg) and b)Equinix science
Park(AM3). Links of c&d)Equinix AMS south east(AM7)
towards Equinix science Park(AM3) and links of e)Equinix
London Docklands(LD8) towards Telehouse Docklands North.
[38] but overall the DNS root infrastructure stayed operational
during the attack.
Our system reports both delay and forwarding anomalies
during the attack, mostly for links in Amsterdam (Fig. 13A-D)
and London facilities (Fig. 13E). Fig. 13A indicates that the
Global Switch links toward Digital Realty (Wenckebachweg)
Amsterdam got affected during both attacks by a severe
forwarding anomaly possibly due to overloaded routers. At
the same time, between 06:00 and 09:00 UTC, we report
links of the same facility towards Equinix Science Park(AM3)
(Fig. 13B) with an unusual differential RTT but without an
obvious change in the forwarding pattern.
Links from Equinix Amsterdam South East(AM7) towards
Equinix Science Park(AM3) also experienced high delays,
possibly due to the same congested router in the far end facility
(Fig. 13C). The increased traffic pattern during the same hour
in Fig. 13D also confirms that the DNS service hosted near
the Science Park handled queries of many other unresponsive
services. These results corroborate with the results of [38]
reporting that many of those services were stressed by sus-
tained traffic during the attack period. It is important also to
note that although the two attacks were chronologically close
events, the impact of the first one was much stronger for the
Amsterdam facilities. During the second attack no RTT change
was observed and only routing anomalies were reported.
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Fig. 14: Outage affecting the links of Sovereign House towards
Telehouse-London(Docklands East) on 2015-11-17 from 14:00
to 15:00 UTC.
3) Telecity Sovereign House outage: On November 17,
2015, a power outage affected London’s Sovereign House
facility where both its primary and secondary supplies failed
to start up. No official announcement was made but reports
from network operators appeared around 2PM local time [39]
and continued until the night of the 18th [40]. Although the
visibility of this facility is limited in our datasets, during
the outage our system reports a clear drop in the number of
traceroutes between London’s Sovereign House facility and
Telehouse-London(Docklands East) (Fig. 14). This illustrates
the benefits of the our system to detect outages although the
number of traceroutes crossing the facility might be low.
Using the proposed colocation facility detection and
anomaly detection algorithms, we can evaluate the impact of
these events on the physical infrastructure. These insights are
not available to previous anomaly detection work [14] as they
work only at the IP-layer.
VI. LIMITATIONS
A. Facility Identification
In large cities multiple facilities may be connected via
cross connect links. When constraining the facility search
through alias resolution, the alias ASN may be a member of
another facility. For example, in Fig.1D if ASC is observed
in traceroutes then the identification of the near-end may fail:
F (ASA) ∩ F (ASC) = {Ø}.
When searching for the far-end facility, we assume that the
AS connected to the IXP is given by the second IP in the far-
end IP pair. Our current implementation maps IP addresses to
ASN by simply matching the longest prefix from Routeviews
data. But if this IP belongs to an inter-AS link we might infer
a wrong ASN. This issue could be addressed by methods
like MAP-IT [41] which is something we are planning to
investigate in future work.
B. Live Monitoring Limitations
Our system requires multiple vantage points and a common
repository to collect all traceroute results (i.e. Atlas probes and
controllers for our current implementation). Outages appearing
close to the data collection may prevent timely access to the
data thus impair the performance of our system. This case hap-
pened during the AMS-IX outage as the RIPE infrastructure
is mainly located in Amsterdam [36].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work leverages large scale traceroute measurements to
monitor the intricate peering world of colocation facilities. We
devised a system that maps colocation facilities to traceroute
data and monitors delay and forwarding anomalies at the
facility level. The proposed system enables us to go beyond
the usual IP-level monitoring as it offers unique inter and intra
facility monitoring capabilities. To demonstrate its benefits
we analyzed eight months of data from the RIPE Atlas
measurement platform and reported important outages caused
by DoS attacks, power outages, and mis-operations. We found
outages that can span across up to eight facilities and last
several hours. These results provide new insights about the
physical locations of facility outages which are crucial for
a better understanding of the peering ecosystem and reliable
connectivity. Furthermore, they provide yet another input for
operators to configure their traffic and avoid outages.
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